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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ FREE PRIOR AND
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
by Alex Page*
INTRODUCTION

I

n a series of recent opinions, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights have emphatically affirmed the internationally-protected rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional
lands and resources and have called upon the states of the hemisphere to uphold their obligations to protect those rights in
domestic law and practice. In so doing, the Court and
Commission have acknowledged the interrelationship between
indigenous land tenure, culture, and self-determination. As an
incident of their rights protected by the American Convention on
Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, the Court and Commission have found that
indigenous peoples have the right to give or withhold their free,
prior informed consent to activities affecting their lands and territories. This right attaches whether or not domestic law protects
property or self-determination rights of indigenous peoples.1
In the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights
system, the conceptual underpinnings for indigenous peoples’
right to free prior informed consent (“FPIC”) lie in the right to
property, on one hand, and rights to self-determination and culture, on the other. This understanding of the two distinct bases
for FPIC is shared by international experts and adjudicatory
bodies outside of the hemisphere2 but perhaps most clearly
explicated in Inter-American jurisprudence. The three leading
cases discussed below articulate this right of indigenous peoples
and illustrate its roots in rights to property, to self-determination, and culture.

COMMUNITY OF AWAS TINGNI V. NICARAGUA
In the early 1990s, the Nicaraguan government granted
licenses (or “concessions”) to a multinational corporation to log on
the traditional lands of the Mayagna Community of Awas Tingni.3
Community members first learned of these concessions when they
awoke one day to find loggers encroaching on their territories. The
logging resulted not only in severe damage to the natural environment, but also in a wide range of social problems related to the
uninvited presence of outsiders and harm to communal resources.
Ultimately, the concessions raised the threat of serious violence
and damage to the community’s cultural integrity.4
At the time of granting logging concessions, Nicaraguan
law provided that indigenous communities located on the
Atlantic Coast were to have some regional autonomy and protection for their land rights.5 This law was not enforced, however, and provided no practical protection to the Awas Tingi
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community against the incursion of multinational resource
extraction interests. With the help of a group of environmental
experts and indigenous rights lawyers, the Awas Tingi community filed a challenge to these incursions on its lands in the
domestic courts of Nicaragua.
When the Nicaraguan courts failed to provide any relief, the
Community filed a petition in the Inter-American Commission
seeking a ruling that Nicaragua’s actions violated the American
Convention on Human Rights, to which Nicaragua is a party.6
The Commission agreed with the Community and took the case
to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, which issued a
preliminary finding based on Article XXI of the American
Convention on Human Rights, which provides a general protection for the human right to property and protects the rights of
indigenous communities to their traditionally occupied lands
and territories. By issuing concessions without the consent of
the Community, the Court found Nicaragua had violated this
right to property.7
In its final ruling, the Court reaffirmed the principle that
indigenous peoples have rights to their traditionally used and
occupied territory, and that these rights arise autonomously under
international law.8 Without using the word consent, the Court held
that the Community’s right to its own property prevent the
Nicaraguan Government from unilaterally exploiting community
natural resources. To fulfill its obligations under the American
Convention, the Commission found that Nicaragua was required
to “officially delimit, demarcate, and title the lands belonging to
the Awas Tingni Community within a maximum period of 15
months, with the full participation of, and considering the customary law, values, usage, and customs of, the Community.”9
The role of culture was particularly important to the court,
which noted that “[f]or indigenous communities, the relationship with the land is not merely one of possession and production, but also a material and spiritual element that they should
fully enjoy, as well as a means through which to preserve their
cultural heritage and pass it on to further generations.”10 The
Court’s conclusion that demarcation could proceed only with
the participation of the Awas Tingni community and in accordance with the Community’s customary law, values, and practices also indicates the central role played in its decision by the
principle of self-determination. Under the Court’s interpretation,
*Alex Page is an attorney with the Indian Law Resource Center in Washington,
D.C., a non-profit law organization that has represented the Community of Awas
Tingni, the Maya Communities of Southern Belize, and the Dann Band of
Western Shoshone, among other indigenous peoples.
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the American Convention on Human Rights protects indigenous
communities’ rights to property such that the right of each community to govern itself and to collectively organize its landholding is also protected.
The dual concepts of collective rights and self-determination for indigenous peoples are essential in understanding how
FPIC may be properly implemented. Because the community as
a whole must decide how it is governed, consent must also come
from the community as a whole. The Awas Tingni court found
that whether a community granted its consent can only be determined by considering and respecting the customary law and
practices of the community.

MARY AND CARRIE DANN V. UNITED STATES
In 1993, two leaders of a Western Shoshone band filed a
petition in the Inter-American Commission against the United
States. Their recourse to the inter-American human rights system followed decades of struggle on the ground and in the
Federal courts of the United States.
Western Shoshone, or “Newe” people, used and occupied a
vast area of the American West for many years prior to
European colonization. During this time, Western Shoshone
society developed a decentralized structure. Small family
groups occupied large areas of
rugged, arid land, and came
together periodically to make
decisions for the greater
Western Shoshone community.
In 1863, the federal government
signed a treaty with the Western
Shoshone confirming their
rights to the land they had traditionally used and occupied.11
Despite the treaty, non-Indians
subsequently moved on to portions of Western Shoshone
lands, and the government took
no action to stop them. Indeed,
many of these incursions were
by the government itself.
While the Dann band fought successfully to prevent
encroachment on the lands it traditionally used and occupied,
the greater Western Shoshone resistance could not stop all incursions onto Western Shoshone lands. Efforts to challenge nonIndian intrusions under law were unsuccessful, in large part
because the federal courts of the United States did not generally recognize Indian tribes’ right to bring lawsuits. In 1946, under
pressure to address the rapidly declining health and welfare of
Indian communities within its borders, the United States established a quasi-judicial administrative body, the Indian Claims
Commission (“ICC”), to provide financial relief to Indian tribes
and nations whose lands and territories had been taken.12
Although many tribes and nations were led to believe that ICC
would provide a forum in which to vindicate their continuing
land rights, the ICC was authorized only to issue money judg-

ments. While the ICC had no authority to confirm or return land
to tribes, it did have the power to discharge the legal obligations
of the United States to Indian nations and thereby to extinguish
title as a practical matter, stripping land from Indian nations and
preventing further recourse against the federal government.
Indian nations seeking redress in the ICC were not allowed to
argue that their land rights should be maintained and protected,
but instead could get relief only if they conceded that their land
rights had been extinguished.13
In 1951 a small group of leaders from the Te-moak Band of
the Western Shoshone filed a case in the Claims Commission.14
Early in the proceedings, other Western Shoshone, including the
Danns, attempted to intervene in order to remove their traditional treaty-protected lands from the claim.15 The ICC rejected
the intervention.16
In order to be eligible for a money judgment, lawyers for
the Te-moak Band stipulated that Western Shoshone land rights
had been extinguished as of 1872.17 The Te-moak Band subsequently informed the ICC that they had fired their lawyers and
sought to revise their pleadings to clarify that title to their lands
had never been extinguished.
At the same time, the Dann Band of Western Shoshone faced
an increasing challenge by the federal government to their longstanding traditional use of lands
protected by the 1863 Treaty. In
1974, the United States sued the
Danns for trespass, claiming that
despite the fact that the 1863
Treaty confirmed Western
Shoshone rights to the land at
issue, subsequent encroachment
by non-Indian settlers made
those rights meaningless.18
The Danns insisted that the
United States had no rights to
their traditional lands and that
its efforts to establish those
rights were unlawful.19 As this
legal battle proceeded, the ICC
issued a ruling in the case before
it. The ICC rejected the Te-moak Band’s efforts to suspend the
litigation and ignored its decision to terminate representation by
its lawyers.20 The ICC held, based on the stipulation made by
Te-moak’s lawyers, that Western Shoshone land rights had been
extinguished and that compensation would be paid.21
Thus, as the Dann Band fought the federal trespass action
against them in federal district court, they faced an adverse
judgment on the case litigated in the ICC without their permission or participation and without the approval of any Western
Shoshone community. Based on the ICC judgment, the United
States Supreme Court later ruled in the Dann’s trespass action –
without deciding whether the Treaty of Ruby Valley continued
to protect the Western Shoshone lands at issue – that the Danns
were prohibited from asserting their land rights against the
United States.22 Despite the Western Shoshones’ refusal to

The dual concepts of
collective rights and selfdetermination for
indigenous peoples are
essential in understanding
how FPIC may be
properly implemented.
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accept the ICC money award23 and despite the fact that the
question of extinguishment was never actually litigated in the
ICC, the Supreme Court’s decision thus left the Western
Shoshone with no judicially confirmed land rights and no apparent means of further recourse to secure those rights.
With no recourse available to them in the federal courts, in
1993 the Danns took their case to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. There, they invoked the same international legal
rights later established in the Awas Tingi case, including the right
to equality, the right to property, and the right to judicial protection.
Because the United States is not a party to the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Danns based their arguments on
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which
applies to all states in the hemisphere and articulates state obligations vis-a-vis these rights. The Danns argued that the US had violated their rights and had failed to uphold the obligations expressed
in the American Declaration by failing to provide a forum for the
proper adjudication of their land rights.
The Commission agreed, finding that the processes
employed by the United States to adjudicate Western Shoshone
land rights “were not sufficient to comply with contemporary
international human rights norms, principles and standards that
govern the determination of indigenous property interests.”24
The Commission examined these norms, principles, and
standards in the context of “evolving rules and principles of
human rights law in the Americas and in the international community more broadly, as reflected in treaties, custom and other
sources of international law” related to indigenous peoples.25
These norms, the Commission found, required “consideration of
[indigenous peoples’] particular historical, cultural, social, and
economic situation and experience” and special attention to the
“connection between communities of indigenous peoples and
the lands and resources that they have traditionally occupied and
used, the preservation of which is fundamental to the effective
realization of the human rights of indigenous peoples more generally and therefore warrants special measures of protection.”26
Looking to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, the International Labour
Organisation’s Convention No. 169, and the Draft American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the
Commission found these general international legal principles
applicable in the context of indigenous human rights to include
state “recognition...of the permanent and inalienable title of
indigenous peoples” and the right “to have such title changed
only by mutual consent between the state and respective indigenous peoples when they have full knowledge and appreciation
of the nature or attributes of such property.”27
The Commission also found that the American Declaration
provisions on fair trial and property require that any determination of indigenous land rights be based on the fully informed
consent of the whole community, meaning that all members
must be fully and accurately informed and have the chance to
participate.28 In the Dann band’s case, the Commission found,
there was no consultation with the community, and no mandate
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from the Western Shoshone for the actions taken in the ICC that
resulted in what the Commission called “the ICC’s finding that
the entirety of the Western Shoshone interest in their ancestral
lands...was extinguished at some point in the past.”29
The Dann ruling demonstrates the challenges attendant to
the implementation of indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC in even
those national systems with complex and relatively sophisticated legal structures. Despite the legitimate reputation of the
United States judicial system as a leading example of strong rule
of law, the Commission found the flaws in the United States system for resolving indigenous land rights to be so egregious that
they constituted human rights violations.
Efforts to implement FPIC for indigenous peoples must
therefore take account of not only developing countries, where
rule of law is often weak, but also countries in which legal
frameworks protecting basic rights to equality and access to the
courts are usually strong. Even in such countries, the Dann case
makes clear, indigenous people may by law be treated in ways
that violate their human rights.
The Commission’s Dann ruling also suggests that a central
inquiry in assessing the efficacy of protections for FPIC will relate
to the issue of who has the authority to give consent for actions
impacting the property rights of indigenous communities. The Temoak Band’s initial decision to take the case to the ICC might reasonably lead one to question whether consent can ever be characterized as free when an indigenous people faces extremely limited options. The subsequent development of the ICC case without
the Danns’ involvement and contrary to the instructions of the Temoak Band suggests that another critical inquiry will relate to the
issue of what procedures are adopted for determining when a
group of individuals has authority to speak for a community or
nation. And special measures will almost certainly be required to
ensure that there is full information and conditions necessary for
indigenous peoples to exercise free choice.

MAYA COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHERN
BELIZE V. BELIZE
At the time of this writing, the case of The Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize was still pending in
the Inter-American Commission. In January 2004, however, the
Government of Belize took the unusual step of making public
the Commission’s preliminary report on the merits in the case,
which had been released to Belize confidentially under the
Commission’s rules several months earlier.30
The Maya case arose when the Belizean government granted logging and oil extraction concessions on Maya lands without obtaining the consent of the Maya communities.31 Despite
the longstanding use and occupancy of these lands by traditional Maya communities, Belizean law considers them to be
national lands under the discretionary authority of the government.32 The actions taken by the Belizean government threatened severe harm to more than three dozen Maya villages in
Southern Belize, and the Maya communities filed a suit in
Belizean courts in 1996 challenging these actions. When the
domestic courts failed to act on their complaint, they filed a peti18

tion with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
In their petition, filed in 1998, the Maya claimed that the
Government’s unilateral issuance of concessions without their
consent violated Maya rights to property, equality, judicial protection, consultation, and self-determination, among other rights.33
The Maya argued that the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man protected these rights and imposed affirmative obligations on the Government of Belize to protect them.
In its preliminary report on the case, the Commission relied
on its conclusion in the Dann case that determinations about the
scope or existence of indigenous peoples’ property rights cannot
be made without the free and informed consent of the peoples
concerned.34 The Commission noted that its application of this
principle in the Dann case related to a judicial determination,
and clarified that the principle also applied in cases of direct natural resource exploitation on indigenous territories: “Articles
XVIII [judicial protection] and XXIII [right to property] of the
American Declaration,” the Commission found, “specially
oblige a member state to ensure that any determination of the
extent to which indigenous claimants maintain interests in the
lands to which they have traditionally held title and have occupied and used is based upon a process of fully informed consent
on the part of the indigenous community as a whole.”35 Given
the Commission’s conclusion that the right to FPIC flows from
the right to property, this conclusion can hardly be controversial.
The ability to decide whether and how the resources on one’s
own property are exploited is an obvious and well-accepted
incident of property ownership.
While confirming that consultation and consent are
required for the protection of indigenous property rights, the
Commission declined to find an independent basis for FPIC in
international law protecting rights to consultation and self-determination, however. Instead, the Commission acknowledged the
arguments put forward by the Maya and held that “the duty to
consult is a fundamental component of the State’s obligations in
giving effect to the communal property right of the Maya people in the lands they have traditionally used and occupied.”36
The Commission reemphasized “the distinct nature of the right
to property as it applies to indigenous people, whereby the land
traditionally used and occupied by these communities plays a
central role in their physical, cultural, and spiritual vitality.”37
For these reasons, the Commission found, violations of separate
provisions of the American Declaration alleged by the Maya
were “subsumed within the broad violations of Article XXIII”
and therefore did not need to be determined.38
In this way, the Commission acknowledged the interrelationship between indigenous self-determination and property
ownership, and found that a proper conception of indigenous
property rights comprehends rights to culture, self-determination, and consultation and consent. Neither indigenous property
rights generally nor FPIC specifically can be properly understood without acknowledgment of this interrelationship, since
communal ownership and self-governance have profound implications for the way indigenous people make decisions related to
land or other property. It is this understanding of the role of self19

determination and cultural integrity that must provide the basis
for the implementation of FPIC.

IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT
Despite strong rulings from the Inter-American
Commission and Court on indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC,
significant barriers to implementing that right on the ground
remain. Foremost among these, perhaps, is the unequal bargaining power of the vast majority of indigenous communities visa-vis national governments and extractive industries. Typically,
indigenous peoples are poor and lack training, experience, or
access to information about international business. Many
nonetheless hold lands and territories with a wealth of natural
resources. Indigenous peoples often lack access to broader markets and economic alternatives to resource extraction. They typically lack political power within the national system and access
to effective judicial protection, in part because national and
local courts and lawyers are often hostile to or ignorant of the
rightful place of indigenous peoples in the law. Implementing an
effective regime under which indigenous peoples can give or
withhold their FPIC to development activities affecting them
thus requires attention to a wide range of broader social and economic issues. In the absence of true equality, it remains an open
question whether the right of indigenous peoples to give or
withhold consent will be adequately protected.
In the face of such concerns, some commentators advocate
for flat prohibitions on alienation of indigenous lands and
resources without the express permission of the national government. Indeed, several countries in the hemisphere have
adopted laws to this effect, though enforcement is inconsistent.39 This approach, however, may perpetuate the paternalism
toward indigenous peoples still rife in many countries, and may
accomplish little toward redressing the fundamental conditions
of inequality that hamper just application of the principle of
FPIC. Furthermore, national governments are frequently principal wrongdoers in efforts to wrest lands and resources from
indigenous control.40
The international arena holds some promise for properly
implementing indigenous peoples’ right to give or withhold consent to development activities affecting their lands and territories, though questions remain whether international institutions
are properly situated to fulfill this promise. Regardless of the
mechanism, proper implementation of FPIC will require a solid
understanding of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination
and cultural integrity, as well as to property and equality. There
must be a firm basis in the customary laws and practices of the
indigenous people concerned. Indigenous peoples must determine the standards by which to gauge whether consent is sought
from a legitimate authority within their communities and
whether conditions are such that their consent is in fact free and
informed. The Inter-American Commission’s rulings in the
Awas Tingni, Dann, and Belize cases suggest that inquiries
regarding proper implementation of FPIC must therefore be
directed at indigenous peoples themselves.
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